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Abstract 
Using a large and long sample of US and European mutual funds we examine the impact that 
membership of a fund family has on performance. We test for strategic and competitive 
behaviours among family funds and whether this affects performance persistence and risk 
taking. While we do not find evidence of stronger performance persistence among family 
funds versus non-family funds, we do find some significant differences in the future 
performance of portfolios of family and non-family funds formed on the basis of past 
performance. We find strong evidence that a fund’s mid-year ranking within its family and 
within its sector affects its risk taking over the remainder of the year.  However, most 
interestingly, we find evidence to suggest differences in the ways in which the US and 
European fund management industries operate, although future microstructure research 
would be required to identify the industry practices and cultures that may be the source of 
these differences.   
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1. Introduction 
A mutual fund family is a group of funds that are managed by the same fund management 
company. It has been argued that being part of a fund family conveys certain benefits on the 
individual funds (for example, see Nanda, Wang and Zheng (2004)). In particular, the ‘family 
members’ may benefit from economies of scale in terms of promotion, advertising and 
distribution that the fund management company can provide for all of its funds.  In addition, 
Nanda et al (2004) argue that fund family members may benefit from the greater flexibility 
afforded by a larger parent organization in terms of the reallocation of human capital and 
other resources in response to changes in financial market conditions.   Since being part of a 
fund family is such a prevalent organizational structure, in this paper we examine the impact 
of family status on fund manager behavior. In particular, we focus on behavior that may 
affect fund performance persistence and risk-taking. The limited extant literature on fund 
families has focused on the US. We examine these behaviors and explore possible differences 
in two major mutual fund markets by using a large data set consisting of over 5,000 European 
and US mutual funds. 
We begin by looking at the impact of family status on the persistence of fund returns. 
Guedj and Papastaikoudi (2005) suggest that funds within a family are more likely to have 
persistent performance than those not in a family. This hypothesis is based on evidence of a 
convex relationship between performance and fund flows, that is, good performance attracts 
capital inflows while poor performance tends not to lead to commensurate fund outflows (see 
for example, Nanda, Wang and Zheng (2004)). This convex performance/fund flow 
relationship may provide fund management companies with an incentive to engage in 
strategic behaviour by supporting and resourcing their better performing funds at the expense 
of their poorer performing funds. This convexity may lead to a situation where, given a 
choice between operating two funds with median performance, or two funds, one a top 
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performing fund and the other a poorly performing fund, the company would choose the latter. 
We test the hypothesis that such strategic resource allocations may increase the chances of 
this good and bad relative performance persisting, that is, a finding of positive persistence 
among funds in a family. 
The second related strategic behaviour of fund management companies that we 
explore relates to the impact of family status on risk taking behaviour. We examine whether 
risk taking behaviour among funds within families changes according to the funds’ relative 
performance. Specifically, we test whether, within a fund family, the risk taking of top 
performing funds (over say the first half of the year) is reduced in the second half of the year 
while the risk taking of bottom performing funds rises. This negative relationship between 
performance and subsequent risk taking behaviour over the course of the year may arise for 
two reasons.  First, a fund management company acting strategically may decide to protect or 
‘bank’ good performance achieved in the early part of the investment period by reducing top 
funds’ risk in the latter part of the period. Similarly, the convex performance/fund flow 
relationship gives the company an incentive to transfer risk to the lower performing funds.  If 
the risks pay off, great; if not, the fund outflows are smaller than the inflows enjoyed by the 
better performing funds.  Second, risk profiles across funds within a family may change over 
the year due to intra-firm competitive behaviour by funds rather than because of the strategic 
behaviour of the fund management company. Funds within a fund family may compete for 
resources including salaries, marketing budgets and, of course, performance bonuses. As 
resources are likely to be skewed towards the top-performing funds, such internal 
competition may alter risk taking behaviour by funds over the year in an effort to improve 
their ranking. We test for a negative relation between fund rank and risk taking behaviour and 
examine whether it is due to competitive or strategic behaviour. 
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The rest of this paper is organised as follows: in Section 2 we review the limited set of 
papers in this area; in Section 3 we present a discussion of our methodology and data; in 
Section 4 we present our results; and finally Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Related Literature 
The mutual fund performance evaluation literature is vast; for a comprehensive review of it 
see Cuthbertson, Nitzsche and O’Sullivan (2008).  In this section of the paper we present a 
more focused discussion of the most relevant literature relating to mutual fund families.   
Guedj and Papastaikoudi (2005) examine fund performance within US mutual fund 
families. They hypothesise that families may promote their funds selectively and that this 
may cause unequal performance within these families. They base this hypothesis on the well-
established empirical finding that fund inflows are attracted to good past performance while 
bad performance does not lead to commensurate outflows (see for example Nanda, Wang and 
Zheng (2004)). This convex relationship gives fund families the incentive to prioritize some 
funds over others. As the majority of mutual funds generate fees for their fund management 
parent as a percentage of assets under management (AUM) rather than on performance, there 
is a further incentive to use this strategy while the percentage of AUM fee structure also 
allows larger families to charge lower percentage fees. Kempf and Ruenzi (2004) find that 
top performing funds in a family grow faster compared to lower ranked funds while Khorana 
and Servaes (1999) find that new fund openings by families are positively related to the 
ability of families to generate additional fee income and family size. In addition, Guedj and 
Papastaikoudi (2005) also hypothesis that larger families should be more capable of affecting 
the performance of their funds since they would be more able to exploit marketing economies 
of scale.  In order to test their hypothesis, Guedj and Papastaikoudi  use Carhart’s (1997) 
recursive portfolio formation methodology to test fund performance persistence. They find 
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evidence of short term persistence among family funds and cite this as evidence that fund 
management companies actively intervene in their funds’ performance. They also find that 
persistence in fund performance is positively related to the number of funds in a family.   
In a similar study, Gaspar, Massa and Matos (2006) examine the issue of favouritism 
within the top 50 US mutual fund families. Favouritism is the adoption of a strategy that 
involves transferring performance (e.g., assigning cheap IPO offerings or similar strategies) 
across member funds to favour particular funds – usually the high performance/high fee 
funds. They call this strategy ‘cross-fund subsidisation’. They also argue that the existence of 
a convex relationship between fund flows and performance is the key motivation for this type 
of strategic behavior even if it is at the expense of some investors. They investigate cross-
subsidisation behaviour by examining whether families enhance the performance of ‘high-
value’ funds (high fee, high performance and young funds) at the expense of ‘low-value’ 
funds (low fee, low performance and old funds). They find that families enhance the 
performance of high-value funds by between 0.7% and 3.3% per year (depending on the 
classifications used). 
Kempf and Ruenzi (2004) argue that funds not only compete for cash flows within 
their market segment, but also within their family. The position of a fund within a family will 
influence its growth because families advertise their star performers. Examining the US 
mutual fund industry, the authors find there is a positive and convex relationship between a 
fund’s family rank and its subsequent growth. The top 20% of funds in a family grow on 
average by an additional 6.78% per year as compared to the other funds in the family after 
controlling for their position within their market sector. 
Kempf and Ruenzi (2008) examine the issue of intra-family competition in the US 
mutual fund industry. They show that fund managers within families compete against other 
managers in the same family for scarce resources – salaries, bonuses or the best advertising 
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budget, etc.  The authors show that fund managers adjust their risk in the second half of the 
year based on their performance in the first half of the year in an attempt to catch up with 
their peers. They also analyse competition within families of different sizes and show that 
strategic interaction takes place in small families but not in large ones. Thus family size is a 
key determinant of whether a fund competes against other managers in the same family or 
behaves strategically within its family.   
The link between industry structure and US mutual fund family performance is also 
analyzed by Massa (2003).  Massa suggests that family-specific characteristics influence the 
way investors evaluate funds. The most important of these characteristics being the ability of 
the investor to move in and out of funds within a family at low cost. The larger the number of 
funds in a family, the greater the value of this option. The results show that this low cost 
ability to switch between funds affects the degree of competition between them. The greater 
the value an investor puts on the low-cost switching option, the less the competition between 
funds and the greater the segmentation of the industry, in terms of family affiliation. Massa 
also finds that investors are influenced by a number of other factors - namely their investment 
horizons, family size and fees and the fact that investors perceive funds as differentiated 
products.  If families are able to differentiate themselves in terms of non-performance-related 
characteristics (e.g., a higher degree of fee differentiation), they have less need to compete in 
terms of performance. 
Our paper contributes to the literature by broadening the scope of the analysis on mutual 
fund families by including European as well as US fund families in our study and by 
exploring differences between the two. We also examine whether: family status affects 
performance persistence; whether a fund’s rank within its family and within its sector affects 
subsequent fund risk taking; whether such a relationship is concave; and whether risk 
changes are due to intra-family competition or strategic management by the parent company.       
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 3. Methodology and Data 
3.1. Persistence Tests 
We begin by examining performance persistence using the recursive portfolio formation  
technique (Hendricks, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1993), Carhart (1997)). This technique involves 
forming portfolios of funds based upon the funds’ performance over some past ranking period 
and evaluating how these portfolios go on to perform over some holding period. Specifically 
here, based on fund alphas from a single factor model over the past 12 months, we form 
(equally weighted) decile portfolios of funds, where decile 1 is comprised of those funds 
which produced the top ten percent of alphas, decile 2 consists of the next ten percent of 
funds and so on while decile 10 contains the funds that produced the bottom ten percent of 
alphas. These decile portfolios are held for one year. This process is repeated recursively 
annually and hence generates ten time series of ‘forward looking’ portfolio returns. If 
persistence exists, the ten alphas of these forward looking portfolios should be decreasing. If 
the persistence is to be of economic significance at least some of the upper decile portfolio 
alphas should be statistically significantly greater than zero. We perform this analysis for our 
set of family and non-family funds separately1.       
We also test whether the alphas of the forward-looking decile portfolios for family 
funds and non-family funds are significantly different. For example, whether the alpha 
produced by decile 1 of funds in a family is different than the alpha produced by decile 1 of 
non-family funds. To do this we run the following regression: 
𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖�𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀,𝑖𝑖� + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖     (1) 
1 We also estimated the alphas using Fama and French’s three factor model but the results were qualitatively 
similar. To test the robustness of our results to alternative portfolio formation techniques we also formed 
portfolios based upon their alpha quartile rankings. We also ranked funds based upon the t-statistic of alpha 
rather than the level of alpha. Our results were unaffected by these variations in the portfolio construction 
process.   
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where RF,it is the excess return (over the risk free rate) at time t on the ith decile portfolio of 
family funds, RNF,it is the excess return at time t on the ith decile portfolio of non-family funds. 
RM,t is the excess return at time t on a proxy for the market portfolio and ε,it is a white noise 
error term.  A statistically significant value of αi in (1) indicates that the decile portfolio 
alphas of family funds and non-family funds are significantly different from each other.   
 
3.2.  Risk  Adjustment Strategy 
To our knowledge, the relative performance and risk-taking behaviour of funds within a 
family has received little attention in the past. There are a couple of reasons, a priori, to 
believe that these may be related. First, because fund managers within a family must share 
scarce resources (salaries, marketing budgets, bonuses etc) it seems plausible that they would 
compete with one another. Here, a manager may feel compelled to increase the risk in their 
fund in the second half of the year if s/he finds that his/her mid-year intra-firm ranking is low. 
Second, on the other hand, fund families may behave strategically where high (low) 
performing funds over the first half of the year may reduce (increase) risk in the second half 
of the year. In this case, the fund management company, or family, may wish to secure rather 
than risk the strong mid-year performance of top funds and transfer risk to low performing 
funds. As noted previously, the convex nature of the performance/fund-flow relationship 
gives firms an incentive to engage in this strategy.   Both these hypotheses indicate a negative 
relationship between mid-year performance and subsequent risk in the second half of the year. 
However, in the second instance in the case of top funds we would also expect the difference 
in risk between the second and first halves of the year to be negative.  In addition, the degree 
of both intra-firm competition and firm level strategic behaviour may be a positive function 
of the number of funds in the family. We also examine this possibility.   
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To test whether a change in the risk profile of a fund from the first to the second half 
of the year is due to its mid-year rank within the family we estimate various forms of the 
following model which are loosely based on  Kempf and Ruenzi (2008). 
 
𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 = 𝑏𝑏0 + 𝑏𝑏1𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹 + 𝑏𝑏2𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆 + 𝑏𝑏3𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖(1) + 𝑏𝑏4𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑏5𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑚𝑚,𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑏6�𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 × 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹 � + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖     (2) 
 
where 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 = 𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖(2) − 𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖(1) represents the change in the standard deviation of fund i’s monthly 
returns over the first half (January – June inclusive) to the second half (July – December 
inclusive) of year t.  𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹  is fund i’s mid-year rank based on all funds’ (within its family) 
average return over January - June inclusive, in year t.2  A rank of 1 is assigned to the worst 
fund within the family, a rank of 2 to the second worst fund and so on. The ranks are 
normalised to make families of different sizes comparable. We test the hypothesis that 𝑏𝑏1 <0.   𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆  is fund i’s mid-year rank relative to all funds in the same sector rather than family. 
The normalised ranks assigned to each fund are constructed using a process similar to the one 
we used to construct 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹 .  It is hypothesised that 𝑏𝑏2 < 0.  In order to control for possible 
mean reversion in volatility, 𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖(1) is specified as a regressor where it is expected that 𝑏𝑏3 < 0.    
𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 is the number of funds in fund i’s family in year t. This allows us to test the hypothesis 
that either competitive or strategic behaviour may be a function of the number of funds in the 
family. We hypothesise that 𝑏𝑏4 > 0.  As all funds in this study are equity funds, in order to 
control for changes in equity market risk between the second and first half of the year, 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑚𝑚,𝑖𝑖 
represents the change in the standard deviation of returns in either the US or European equity 
market (as appropriate to fund i) between the first half and the second half of year t.  It is 
hypothesised that 𝑏𝑏5 > 0.  We specify an interactive dummy variable, �𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 × 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹 �, in order 
2 Patel, Zeckhauser and Hendricks (1994) show that investors care more about rankings than about absolute 
performance. 
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to examine whether the sensitivity of a fund’s reaction to its mid-year rank differs depending 
on whether it is a high ranked or low ranked fund. Here, D=1 if fund i ranks below the family 
median and D=0 otherwise.  Equation 2 is estimated as a pooled regression.  For statistical 
robustness a minimum observation restriction of 60 months for each fund was applied. 
To summarise, we put forward two hypotheses in the paper to explain why the risk of 
funds within families may change from the first to the second half of the year. First, intra-
family competition between fund managers for resources including individual bonuses, 
marketing budgets, salaries etc, may be one source of this change.  Poorly performing funds 
(funds that rank below the mid-year median performance) may feel under pressure to increase 
risk in the second half of the year in order to ‘catch up’ with better performing family 
members. Second, the fund management company may engage in strategic behaviour by 
transferring risk from high performers to low performers because of the well-documented 
phenomenon that top-performing funds generally experience greater inflows than funds that 
underperform experience outflows.  The model set up allows us to distinguish between the 
two hypotheses.  Under the second hypothesis mid-year winners should exhibit Δσi,t =
σi,t(2) − σi,t(1) < 0 on average.  If Δσ is positive on average for both winner and loser funds this 
would indicate that the explanation for the negative relation between fund rank and a 
subsequent change in risk lies in competitive intra-firm behaviour rather than being due to 
strategic behaviour on the part of the fund management company.  
 
3.3.  Data 
The dataset is comprised of European and US equity mutual fund monthly returns between 
January 1993 and June 2009 from Morningstar.  Non-surviving funds are included to account 
for survivorship bias. In total there are 5,714 funds of which 3,703 are US funds while 2,011 
are European funds. Returns are gross of buying and selling expenses but are net of annual 
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management fees and are gross of income-tax so that the they are comparable  between the 
two regions.  Finally, all returns are inclusive of reinvested income. 
Morningstar provides the management company name of each fund, making it 
possible to identify a fund’s family. There are 666 families in the dataset with the number of 
funds per family ranging from 2 to 141. The majority of families are small; 80% of families 
comprise 9 or fewer funds. Only 9% of families have 20 or more funds. There are 498 funds 
that we are able to classify as being non-family funds.  This information is summarised in 
Figure 1. The US and European equity market indices that we used to calculate 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑚𝑚,𝑖𝑖 in (2) 
were collected from Datastream.  Finally, Morningstar also provides information about each 
fund’s sector which we also collected.   
 
4. Results 
4.1  Persistence 
In Table 1 we present the results of persistence tests based upon the recursive portfolio 
formation technique outlined in Section 3.  We present the results for US equity family funds 
(Panel A) and non- family funds (Panel B) and for European family funds (Panel C) and non-
family funds (Panel D).  Decile 1 is formed by holding the ten percent of funds with the 
highest pre-ranking alphas while decile 10 ten is comprised of the ten percent of funds with 
the lowest pre-ranking alphas.  Each panel presents the average monthly return for each 
decile along with each decile portfolio monthly alpha and its t-statistic.   We also present the 
box plots of the average monthly returns of each family and non-family decile in Figures 2 
(US) and 3 (European), to show how the return distributions differ3. 
There is evidence of persistence in all four panels because both the average returns 
and alphas decline from decile 1 to decile 10, though not monotonically.  Spearman rank 
3 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting their inclusion. 
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correlations between fund alphas and the series 1 to10 are statistically significant at the 5% 
significance level in all four cases. Across all four panels there is very little evidence of 
economically significant persistence because top decile alphas are not positive and 
statistically significant; the only exception here is decile 1 for European non-family funds. 
There is stronger evidence of persistence among low ranked deciles many of which show 
significantly negative alphas at the 5% level of statistical confidence. 
 We test whether the decile alphas of family funds are significantly different from the 
corresponding decile alphas of non-family funds.  We find that among lower deciles (between 
decile 7 to decile 10) the poorer performing family funds go on to perform significantly better, 
or rather less badly, than their non-family counterparts. We posit that this is likely to be 
because family funds have greater scope to address poor performing individual funds – 
perhaps by reducing fees, changing strategies, knowledge spillovers from better funds, 
economies of scale, substituting the manager or merging them into other funds.            
Overall, the finding of persistence among family funds does not rule out the 
hypothesis that family funds are behaving strategically (taking advantage of the convex 
performance-flow relationship) but we do not find that this behavior is greater among family 
funds than among the control group of non-family funds. 
 
4.2  Risk Adjustment Strategy 
We report the results of our tests designed to investigate the hypothesis that, arising from 
either strategic or competitive behaviour, fund managers in a fund family adjust the risk 
profile of their fund in the second half of the year based upon their relative performance in 
the first half of the year.  We estimate a number of forms of Equation (2). Table 2, Panel A 
presents results for the US family funds, Panel B reports results for European family funds 
while Panel C reports results for the combined sample of US and European funds. For each 
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estimated model the tables show OLS coefficients with p values in parentheses. All 
regressions include a constant. 
For US family funds in Panel A we find that the coefficient on 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹  is negative in all 
model estimations and is highly statistically significant with p values equal to zero in all 
models (except one where it is significant at the 10% significance level). Even after 
controlling for other factors, these results provide strong evidence that mid-year ‘loser’ 
(below median) funds increase risk more than mid-year ‘winner’ (above median) funds 
and/or that mid-year winners reduce risk in the second half of the year.  However, if the latter 
were the case, mid-year winners should exhibit 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 = 𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖(2) − 𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖(1) < 0 on average. Our data 
show that although there is a negative relationship between 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥 and 𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹 , 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥 is positive on 
average for both winner and loser funds. This indicates that the explanation for the negative 
relation between fund rank and a subsequent change in risk lies in competitive intra-firm 
behavior rather than being due to strategic behavior by the fund management company in 
transferring risk from high performers to low performers.  However, interestingly, when we 
look at European fund families in Panel B we find the opposite result: mid-year winners 
increase risk more than mid-year losers. This finding does not support the hypothesis of the 
existence of intra-family competition among family funds in Europe.  In our combined 
sample, Panel C, the negative fund rank/subsequent risk taking relation found for US family 
funds dominates the sample, unsurprisingly since US funds represent almost two-thirds of the 
combined sample.          
While for US family funds the above establishes a negative relation between mid-year 
rank and subsequent risk, we also examined whether a fund’s reaction to its mid-year rank 
differs depending on whether it is a high or a low ranked fund. We do this by introducing an 
interactive dummy variable �𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 × 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹 � where D=1 if fund i ranks below the family median 
and D=0 otherwise.  From Table 2, Panel A we find that the coefficient on this dummy 
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variable is positive and significant at the 10% level of significance.  This lends support to the 
earlier finding that mid-year losers tend to increase the risk in their fund by more than mid-
year winners, but at a diminishing rate. 
Moving to the effect of a fund’s sector rank, 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆 , on its subsequent risk we find 
similar results to those found around the impact of family rank. In the case of US family 
funds (Panel A) mid-year sector losers increase risk more than mid-year sector winners, while 
the opposite is the case for European family funds (Pane B). These results are significant at 
the 1% level of significance in both markets. Again, these results point to stronger intra-sector 
competition in the US compared to Europe. In Panel C  in the combined sample the positive 
but generally insignificant coefficients on 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆  are likely to be the result of the opposing 
negative and positive effects of this variable among US and European family funds 
respectively. 
In examining the role played by a fund’s mid-year family rank and sector rank on its 
subsequent risk, we controlled for the possible role played by other factors. We see from 
Table 2 that funds in larger families increase risk in the second half of the year by more than 
funds from small families, though this effect is only found to be statistically significant for 
European funds.  Finally, the coefficients on our control variables for (i) mean reversion in 
volatility and (ii) changes in equity market risk between the second and first halves of the 
year are both signed in accordance with expectations across all models and are also highly 
statistically significant. 
Finally, the last two rows of Panels A, B and C of Table 2 present estimates of model 
5 over the first half of our sample (5-1) and the second half (5-2).  These sub-sample results  
show that the full sample results are robust.  The coefficient estimates are generally similar in 
both cases. 
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5. Conclusions 
In this paper we examine the impact that a mutual fund’s family status has on its performance. 
First, we test whether family status gives rise to strategic behaviour on the part of fund 
management companies which generates stronger performance persistence among family 
funds compared to non-family funds. Second, we test whether family membership creates 
intra-family competition which affects the risk taking behaviour of funds. While we do not 
find evidence of stronger persistence among family funds compared to non-family funds, we 
do show that holding portfolios of funds based on their past performance leads in some 
instances to significant differences in performance between family versus non-family funds. 
We also provide evidence to suggest that a fund’s mid-year ranking within its family and 
within its sector affects its risk taking over the remainder of the year but interestingly that this 
effect differs between US and European family funds. Among US funds, intra-family and 
intra-sector competition dominates where mid-year losers increase risk by more than mid-
year winners (albeit at a diminishing rate) in an attempt to catch up.  The opposite is found to 
be the case for European family funds.  Overall then, these results highlight significant 
differences in the ways in which the US and European fund management industries operate. 
Future microstructure research is required to identify the industry practices and cultures that 
may be the source of these differences. 
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 Table 1: Recursive Portfolio Formation Tests of Persistence 
Table 1 presents the results of the recursive portfolio methodology for testing for performance persistence. At time t we sort the funds in our sample on 
a single factor model alpha over t to t-12 into equally weighted deciles, where decile 1 contains the top 10% of funds while decile 10 contains the 
lowest 10% of funds. We hold these decile portfolios over t to t+1.  This process is repeated recursively over the sample period to generate a time 
series of holding period or ‘forward looking’ returns. The Table reports the average return, alpha and absolute t-statistic of alpha of these forward 
looking decile portfolios.  
 
 
 
 Table 2, Panel A: Risk Adjustment Strategy – US Family Funds 
 
𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 = 𝑏𝑏0 + 𝑏𝑏1𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹 + 𝑏𝑏2𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆 + 𝑏𝑏3𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖(1) + 𝑏𝑏4𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑏5𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑚𝑚,𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑏6�𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 × 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹 � + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 
Table 2 shows the results of pooled regressions of the change in a fund’s risk between the first and second half of 
the year on a number of fund characteristics and control variables using the first half of the full sample. Results 
relate to the combined sample of US and European family  funds. 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 = 𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖(2) − 𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖(1) represents the change in 
the standard deviation of fund i’s monthly returns over the first half (January – June inclusive) to the second half 
(July – December inclusive) of year t. 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹  is fund i’s mid-year rank based on all funds’ (within its family) 
average return over January - June inclusive, in year t. A rank of 1 is assigned to the worst fund within the 
family, a rank of 2 to the second worst fund and so on. The ranks are normalised to make families of different 
sizes comparable. 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆  is fund i’s mid-year (similarly normalised) rank relative to all funds in the same sector. 
𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖(1) is specified to control for mean reversion in volatility. 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖is the number of funds in fund i’s family in year t. 
𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑚𝑚,𝑖𝑖 represents the change in the standard deviation of returns in either the US or European equity market (as 
appropriate to fund i) over the first half (January – June inclusive) to the second half (July – December 
inclusive) of year t. This is specified  to control for changing risk in equity markets generally. �𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 × 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹 �is an 
interactive dummy variable to examine whether a fund’s reaction to its mid-year rank differs depending on 
whether it is a high ranked or low ranked fund. Here, D=1if fund i ranks below the family median and D=0 
otherwise.  Finally, the last two rows present estimates of model 5 over the first half of our sample (5-1) and the 
second half (5-2). 
 
   Coefficient    
Model 𝒃𝒃𝟏𝟏 𝒃𝒃𝟐𝟐 𝒃𝒃𝟑𝟑 𝒃𝒃𝟒𝟒 𝒃𝒃𝟓𝟓 𝒃𝒃𝟔𝟔 
 
(1) 
 
-0.340 
(0.000) 
  
-0.400 
(0.000) 
   
       
(2) -0.273 
(0.000) 
 -0.219 
(0.000) 
 0.527 
(0.000) 
 
       
(3) -0.214 
(0.000) 
-0.103 
(0.010) 
-0.219 
(0.000) 
 0.528 
(0.000) 
 
       
(4) -0.212 
(0.093) 
-0.104 
(0.010) 
-0.219 
(0.000) 
0.0001 
(0.382) 
0.528 
(0.000) 
 
       
(5) -0.174 
(0.000) 
-0.104 
(0.010) 
-0.219 
(0.000) 
0.0002 
(0.341) 
0.528 
(0.000) 
0.104 
(0.092) 
       
(5-1) -0.028 -0.216 -0.315 0.0002 0.660 0.032 
 (0.876) (0.121) (0.000) (0.780) (0.000) (0.896) 
       
(5-2) -0.270 -0.060 -0.213 -0.001 0.516 0.066 
 (0.000) (0.121) (0.000) (0.710) (0.000) (0.278) 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 2, Panel B: Risk Adjustment Strategy – European Family Funds 
 
𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 = 𝑏𝑏0 + 𝑏𝑏1𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹 + 𝑏𝑏2𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆 + 𝑏𝑏3𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖(1) + 𝑏𝑏4𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑏5𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑚𝑚,𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑏6�𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 × 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹 � + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 
Table 2 shows the results of pooled regressions of the change in a fund’s risk between the first and second half of 
the year on a number of fund characteristics and control variables using the first half of the full sample. Results 
relate to the combined sample of US and European family  funds. 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 = 𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖(2) − 𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖(1) represents the change in 
the standard deviation of fund i’s monthly returns over the first half (January – June inclusive) to the second half 
(July – December inclusive) of year t. 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹  is fund i’s mid-year rank based on all funds’ (within its family) 
average return over January - June inclusive, in year t. A rank of 1 is assigned to the worst fund within the 
family, a rank of 2 to the second worst fund and so on. The ranks are normalised to make families of different 
sizes comparable. 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆  is fund i’s mid-year (similarly normalised) rank relative to all funds in the same sector. 
𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖(1) is specified to control for mean reversion in volatility. 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖is the number of funds in fund i’s family in year t. 
𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑚𝑚,𝑖𝑖 represents the change in the standard deviation of returns in either the US or European equity market (as 
appropriate to fund i) over the first half (January – June inclusive) to the second half (July – December 
inclusive) of year t. This is specified  to control for changing risk in equity markets generally. �𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 × 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹 �is an 
interactive dummy variable to examine whether a fund’s reaction to its mid-year rank differs depending on 
whether it is a high ranked or low ranked fund. Here, D=1if fund i ranks below the family median and D=0 
otherwise. Finally, the last two rows present estimates of model 5 over the first half of our sample (5-1) and the 
second half (5-2). 
 
   Coefficient    
Model 𝒃𝒃𝟏𝟏 𝒃𝒃𝟐𝟐 𝒃𝒃𝟑𝟑 𝒃𝒃𝟒𝟒 𝒃𝒃𝟓𝟓 𝒃𝒃𝟔𝟔 
 
(1) 
 
0.557 
(0.000) 
  
-0.495 
(0.000) 
   
       
(2) 0.474 
(0.000) 
 -0.270 
(0.000) 
 0.795 
(0.000) 
 
       
(3) 0.155 
(0.009) 
0.579 
(0.000) 
-0.275 
(0.000) 
 0.797 
(0.000) 
 
       
(4) 0.202 
(0.001) 
0.560 
(0.000) 
-0.275 
(0.000) 
0.002 
(0.000) 
0.796 
(0.000) 
 
       
(5) 0.221 
(0.001) 
0.561 
(0.000) 
-0.276 
(0.000) 
0.002 
(0.000) 
0.7978 
(0.000) 
0.055 
(0.329) 
       
(5-1) 0.656 1.787 -0.649 0.002 0.459 -0.221 
 (0.207) (0.000) (0.000) (0.298) (0.000) (0.732) 
       
(5-2) 0.318 0.497 -0.292 0.001 0.825 0.075 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.389) 
 
  
 
 Table 2, Panel C: Risk Adjustment Strategy – All Family Funds 
 
𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 = 𝑏𝑏0 + 𝑏𝑏1𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹 + 𝑏𝑏2𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆 + 𝑏𝑏3𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖(1) + 𝑏𝑏4𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑏5𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑚𝑚,𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑏6�𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 × 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹 � + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 
Table 2 shows the results of pooled regressions of the change in a fund’s risk between the first and second half of 
the year on a number of fund characteristics and control variables using the first half of the full sample. Results 
relate to the combined sample of US and European family  funds. 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 = 𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖(2) − 𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖(1) represents the change in 
the standard deviation of fund i’s monthly returns over the first half (January – June inclusive) to the second half 
(July – December inclusive) of year t. 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹  is fund i’s mid-year rank based on all funds’ (within its family) 
average return over January - June inclusive, in year t. A rank of 1 is assigned to the worst fund within the 
family, a rank of 2 to the second worst fund and so on. The ranks are normalised to make families of different 
sizes comparable. 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆  is fund i’s mid-year (similarly normalised) rank relative to all funds in the same sector. 
𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖(1) is specified to control for mean reversion in volatility. 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖is the number of funds in fund i’s family in year t. 
𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑚𝑚,𝑖𝑖 represents the change in the standard deviation of returns in either the US or European equity market (as 
appropriate to fund i) over the first half (January – June inclusive) to the second half (July – December 
inclusive) of year t. This is specified  to control for changing risk in equity markets generally. �𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 × 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹 �is an 
interactive dummy variable to examine whether a fund’s reaction to its mid-year rank differs depending on 
whether it is a high ranked or low ranked fund. Here, D=1if fund i ranks below the family median and D=0 
otherwise. Finally, the last two rows present estimates of model 5 over the first half of our sample (5-1) and the 
second half (5-2). 
 
   Coefficient    
Model 𝒃𝒃𝟏𝟏 𝒃𝒃𝟐𝟐 𝒃𝒃𝟑𝟑 𝒃𝒃𝟒𝟒 𝒃𝒃𝟓𝟓 𝒃𝒃𝟔𝟔 
 
(1) 
 
-0.069 
(0.062) 
  
-0.430 
(0.000) 
   
       
(2) -0.044 
(0.087) 
 -0.239 
(0.000) 
 0.578 
(0.000) 
 
       
(3) -0.078 
(0.018) 
0.059 
(0.078) 
-0.240 
(0.000) 
 0.579 
(0.000) 
 
       
(4) -0.055 
(0.093) 
0.049 
(0.132) 
-0.240 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.578 
(0.000) 
 
       
(5) -0.013 
(0.375) 
0.049 
(0.129) 
-0.239 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.578 
(0.000) 
0.116 
(0.031) 
       
(5-1) -0.211 0.031 -0.362 0.001 0.620 0.058 
 (0.233) (0.808) (0.000) (0.535) (0.000) (0.807) 
       
(5-2) -0.039 0.054 -0.232 0.001 0.574 0.099 
 (0.303) (0.108) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.056) 
 
 
